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Conflict of Laws
by J ahn A. Garfinkel*

The Choice of Law Process-Injuries to Person or Property
This is the year of Reich v. Purcell/ a case that is simple
on its facts but far reaching in its effects on the development of
the choice of law process in California. Mrs. Reich, the wife
of Lee Reich, and their two children were driving from Ohio
to California, where they contemplated settling. In Missouri
their car collided with a motor vehicle owned and operated
by the defendant, a California resident. The wife and one
child were killed. Plaintiffs were the surviving husband and
child who, prior to the commencement of the action, became
domiciled in California. Missouri has a statutory limitation
of $25,000 on recovery in wrongful death actions; California
* A.B. 1926, J.D. 1929, J.S.D. 1931,
University of California, Berkeley.
Dean and Professor of Law, Golden
Gate College, School of Law. Member, California State Bar.
The author extends his appreciation
to Robert F. Lee, student at Golden
6

Gate College, School of Law, for assistance in preparation of this article.
1. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31.
432 P.2d 727 (1967). See Comments
on Reich v. PurcelL 15 UCLA Law
Rev. 551-654 (l96R).
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and Ohio have no such limitation. On appeal, liability and
damages were stipulated and the only issue was whether the
judgment in the action for the wife's death should be $55,000
actual loss, or $25,000, under the Missouri limitation.
Four courses of action were open to the court:
(1) It could apply the Missouri limitation, following traditional theory2 that .the law of the place of the tort, i.e., the
place of impact, controlled;
(2) It could apply Ohio substantive law on the theory that
Ohio was the interested state, since plaintiffs were still domiciled there at the time of the injury;3
(3) It could apply the law that Ohio would apply, including its choice of law rule, modifying the second suggested
course of action by the invocation of the renvoi doctrine;4
( 4) It could apply the substantive law of California on
the dual grounds that California was the forum and the interested state by virtue of plaintiffs' contemplated domicile
at the time of injury and actual domicile at the time suit was
commenced.
The supreme court, in a unanimous opinion, rejected the
mechanical test of the lex loci delicti in favor of an approach
which would consider the interests of the three states involved, concluded that the interest of Ohio should control,
and applied the substantive law of Ohio.
What does this mean, as a guide to the development of
choice of law "rules" in tort cases?
First, and most clearly and emphatically, the vested-rights
approach is now expressly repudiated. What was formerly
disguised in Grant v. McAulifje,5 is now openly avowed.
2. 67 Cal.2d at 553, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
33, 432 P.2d at 729. See Slater v.
Mexican National Ry. Co., 194 U.S.
120,48 L.Ed. 900, 24 S.Ct. 581 (1904);
Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10
P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. 1264 (1932). Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 378 et
seq.

4. This possibility is not suggested
in the opinion and would clearly be
contrary to the great weight of authority in the United States which rejects
rell\·vi. Cf. the concurring opinion in
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty, 7
Wis.2d 130,95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).

3. 67 Cal.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 34, 432 P.2d at 730.
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Loranger v. Nadeau,6 Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon CO.,7
"and other cases to the contrary [e.g. Victor v. SperryS] are
overruled."9 California thus joins with New York,I° Pennsylvania,l1 Wisconsin,I2 and others 13 in rejecting the view
that the law of the impact state creates the cause of action
and determines the existence and extent of the rights and
obligations of the parties.
Second, and equally clearly and emphatically, the rejection
of the law of the place of the tort does not, either directly or
indirectly, produce any new law-finding or jurisdiction-finding
device. A new technique must be employed in the choice of
law process.
Third, and most significant, is the articulation and development of this technique, and it is here that the decision in
Reich v. Purcell will have its greatest impact. The opinion
proceeds essentially along the path suggested in the writings
of Brainerd Currie. 14 The governing principle is: "The forum
must search to find the proper law to apply based upon the
interests of the litigants and the involved states."15 This principle is simple to state; the problems arise in its application.
The notable contribution of the opinion is its analysis of
the forces that bear upon the question of determining the interests that are to be served. The interest of Missouri in the
precise question at issue in Reich was quickly disposed of.
6. 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63, 84
A.L.R. 1264 (1932).
7. 153 Cal. 438, 95 P. 862 (1908).
8. 163 Cal. App.2d 518, 329 P.2d
728 (1958).
9. 67 Cal.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 34, 432 P.2d at 730.
10. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473,191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,
95 A.L.R.2d I (1963).
11. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
416 Pa. I, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
12. Haumschild v. Continental Casualty, 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959).
13. See generally R. Leflar, AmericalZ

COllflicts Law, Ch. 14 at p. 325 et seq.

(1968) .
14. See B. Currie, Selected Essays all
the COlZflict of Laws (1963), and par·

ticularly Notes on Methods and Ob·
jectives in the Conflict of Laws, Duke
LJ. 171, (1959), reprinted in Selected
Essays, 177 et seq. For analysis of the
opinion in the light of the Currie ap·
proach, see Comments on Reich v.
Purcell by Herma Hill Kay, 15 UCLA
Law Rev. 584 et seq., and David P.
Currie, 15 UCLA Law Rev. 595 et
seq.

15. 67 Cal.2d at 553, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 33, 432 P.2d at 729.
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The measure of damages may be looked at from plaintiffs'
viewpoint as compensation to the survivors or from defendant's
viewpoint as avoiding an excessive financial burden. However, since no party was a Missouri resident or a resident of a
state with a similar limitation, no interest of any party or
of any such state would be served by imposing the damage
limitation.
The choice was narrowed to Ohio and California. Since
their laws and policies were the same, there was no need to
choose between them. However, the court did make the
choice, presumably to avoid giving undue encouragement in
the future to forum shoppers. 16 The decision emphasized the
concept of retention of the last domicile until a new domicile
is actually created,17 found that plaintiffs' plans to change
their domicile from Ohio to California "were not definite and
fixed",18 and concluded that California was a disinterested
forum, as of the date the cause of action arose, and therefore
had no interest in applying its own law. To hold otherwise,
the court feared, might encourage injured parties to engage
in domicile shopping as a prelude to forum shopping. Ohio
was left as the only interested state, renvoi was rejected, and
Ohio's internal law was held to govern the issue of damages.
The decision clarifies what has heretofore been frequently
suggested, but has been as yet unsettled in California choice of
law cases. In A laska Packers v. Industrial Accident Commission/ 9 California in 1934 rejected a mechanical reliance on
the law of the place where the injured workman was regularly
employed and injured, in favor of the law of California as the
place where he had originally been employed and to which he
had returned on termination of the employment. 2o California's interest, stemming from the fact that if the employee
became a public charge the burden would be felt in California,
16. 67 Cal.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 34, 432 P.2d at 730.

18. 67 Cal.2d at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
34, 432 P.2d at 730.

17. But cf. Matteucci v. Messersmith,
385 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. [1967]) and
proposed text, Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, 2d, § 16 Comment (d).

19. 1 Cal.2d 250, 34 P.2d 716 (1934);
affirmed, 294 U.S. 532, 79 L.Ed. 1044,
55 S.Ct. 518 (1935).
20. 1 Cal.2d at 261-262, 34 P.2d at
721-722.
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was held sufficient to justify taking jurisdiction and making
an award. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. A
like approach was taken in 1939 in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission/ a situation the
exact converse of the Alaska Packers case. The employee was
a resident of Massachusetts and was injured while temporarily
in California in the course of his employment. California took
jurisdiction and applied its law, finding an interest in the need
to protect those who had furnished medical and hospital care
to the injured person. However, in tort cases, the California
decisions had not followed a clear path.
In Loranger v. Nadeau,2 the law of Arizona, the place of
injury, was applied to determine the duty owed to the guest in
a motor vehicle. In Victor v. Sperry,3 a case involving a collision in Mexico between two vehicles registered in California
and with all parties California residents, the measure of damages was held to be controlled by Mexican law.
On the other hand, in Hudson v. Von Hamm 4 and Thome
v. Macken 5 California courts invoked local public policy to
close their doors to suits based on torts committed elsewhere.
Departures from the rule of lex loci delicti occurred in Grant
v. McAuliffe 6 where the issue of survival was "characterized"
as "procedural", and governed by forum law, and in Emery
v. Emeri where the issue of intra-family immunity was held
to be governed by domiciliary law.
1. 10 Cal.2d 567, 75 P.2d 1058
(1938); affirmed, 306 U.S. 493, 83 L.
Ed. 940, 59 S.Ct. 629 (1939).
2. 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63, 84
A.L.R. 1264 (1932).
3. 163 Cal. App.2d 518, 329 P.2d
728 (1958). See the criticism of this
decision in 1. Schnake & 1. Murad, ConfEct of Laws-Tarts-California, 16
Hastings L.J. 42 (1964).
4. 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 P. 374
(1927). This was a suit by injured party against the parents of a minor tortfeasor; the complaint alleged injury in

Hawaii and the imputed liability of the
parents under Hawaiian law.
S. 58 Cal. App.2d 76, 136 P.2d 116
(1943). This was a suit for alienation
of affections, in which plaintiffs were
residents of Oregon and the activity of
defendant took place in that state.
Civil Code section 43.5 was held to bar
relief. Cf. Younker v. Reseda Manor,
255 Cal. App.2d 431, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1967), discussed infra.
6. 41 Ca1.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42
A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953).
7. 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218
(1955).
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The court is now clearly committed. Loranger is expressly
overruled; Victor v. Sperry may be regarded as overruled; the
circumlocutions of Grant and Emery are now superfluities.
How sound is the result as a matter of interest analysis?
There is no question that the rejection of Missouri law and its
limitation on damages is proper, and there is also no question
that the rejection of renvoi in the application of Ohio law is
also proper. Therefore, viewed solely by its result, the decision is clearly correct. It is arguable, however, that the
court may have too hastily disclaimed a California interest.
Concededly, California solely as a forum had no interest, and
if plaintiffs had never been domiciled in California, there was
no reason to apply California law. Conceivably, California
has a positive interest in not encouraging prospective plaintiffs
to select a California domicile, ex post facto, to enhance their
claims. But in this case, the plaintiffs were en route to California when the accident happened, and there was a present,
good faith, although tentative, decision to remove to California. Under these circumstances, acceptance of a California
interest would not open the door to forum shopping. Since
the entire financial burden of the event fell upon persons who
were California residents at the time of suit, the court might
well have applied California law. This approach, while irrelevant to the ultimate result in Reich, may be vital in other
cases where the facts are only slightly different.
And this leads to the next question, what does Reich portend
for the future? It is clear that while the decision sets a general course, it does not purport to answer many of the particular questions that will arise in the future in analogous,
but not identical situations. What, for example, would be the
result, if the defendant were a resident of a state having a limitation on liability? Or, if the plaintiffs were residents of a
state with a limitation on liability and the accident happened
in a state without a limitation on liability? Would the result
in either of these hypothetical cases be changed, if it were
established that the plaintiffs' decision to remove to California
had been definite and fixed, the former home disposed of, the
furniture packed, and the new position accepted, but no new
86
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domicile "established" in the traditional sense? This uncertainty exists; it is undesirable from the point of view of attorneys advising clients, but it could hardly be otherwise within
the framework of the judicial process. The supreme court
in Reich is functioning in the true common-law tradition, 8 the
same tradition manifested in its opinions in other recent choice
of law cases;9 it is deciding the case before it. Eventually rules
will emerge, but they will be the product of the decisional
process in many cases and not the result of an abstract formulation in the course of a single opinion. For the present,
counsel must rely on suggestions from commentators and interpretations from the courts in subsequent cases. There is
a plethora of the former lo and, within the period of this volume,
three of the latter. To these we now turn.
Schneider v. Schimme/s,ll so far as relevant to the present
discussion, was an action for the husband's loss of consortium
arising out of defendant's alleged wrong to the wife. All
events occurred in Colorado and all parties were Colorado
residents at the time of the injury. California was the forum
only because it was the state to which defendant "happened
to move,,12 after the event and a series of delays, coupled
with inadequacies in Colorado's jurisdictional statutes, had
prevented the Colorado court acquiring in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. 13 Colorado recognizes loss of consortium as an element of damages; California does not. The
court of appeals, first district, applying the same approach
as Reich, concluded that the issue involved was one of compensation for a wrong suffered, and that Colorado, as the state
8. See Radin, The Trail of the Calf,
32 Cornell L. Q. 137 (1946).
9. See, notably, Bernkrant v. Fowler,
55 Cal.2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360
P.2d 906 (1961).
10. See, for example, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. Rev.
551-654 (1968).

11. 256 Cal. App.2d 366, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 273 (1967).
12. 256 Cal. App.2d at 373, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 277.

13. The tale of futile efforts in Colorado is narrated in 256 Cal. App.2d
at 368-369, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 274-275;
it covered a period of little less than
(wo years and raised a serious question
of the California statute of limitations
and the saving provision of section 355
of the California Code of Civil Procedure. For another illustration of
Colorado's jurisdictional problems, see
Bay Aviation Services Co. v. District
Court, 149 Colo. 542, 370 P.2d 752
(1962).
CAL LAW 1969
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of both parties' domicile at the time of injury, had the greater
interest. California's rule denying recovery for loss of consortium was said not to involve any matter of California interest or public policy but to exist merely "because the
Legislature has not seen fit to provide for the allowance of such
damages."14 The decision well illustrates how fine the line
is in these cases, and how much depends upon the manner in
which the interest involved is defined. If California's rule
disallowing recovery for loss of consortium were said to be
based on a policy consideration that such loss could not or
should not be measured in monetary terms and therefore was
not compensable, or that as a matter of California "policy"
no action could be maintained for such an injury, the opposite
result would seem to be required. 15
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,16 the second of the cases, involved the applica-

bility of the California workmen's compensation statute to
an extremely complex, four-state factual situation. The employee, a California resident, had registered for employment
with a Colorado agency. His employment was initiated by
a telephone conversation with the agency while the employee
was still in California. Pursuant to the conversation he went
to Wyoming at his own expense and there entered into a
written contract of employment. He was injured while on
assignment in Utah and under a Utah statute received benefits
that he later sought to augment by application for compensation in California. Resolution of the problem was treated
as essentially a matter of statutory construction, namely
whether the employee was working pursuant to a labor contract made in California, since if he was, under sections 5305
and 3600.5 of the California Labor Code, the California compensation act was applicable. 17
14. 256 Cal. App.2d at 373, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 277.
15. Cf. Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal.
App.2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943); see
footnote 5 supra, for the facts and
holding.
88
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Thus, this case differs substantially in posture from Reich
and Schneider. The court did not have to determine the principal choice of law rule or the interest of California. The
legislature had already performed those functions by determining that California's interest extended to labor contracts
made in California and that California law was to be applied
to them. However, the court did have to determine the
"incidental" or "preliminary" question of where the labor
contract was made. In resolving this matter, choice of law
problems and policy considerations did arise in connection
with three separate issues: (i) was the employment agency
an agent of the employer, the employee, or neither; (ii) was
the telephone conversation an oral contract of employment
made in California; (iii) if an oral contract was made in California, was the written agreement in Wyoming a rescission of
or only an implementation of the prior oral contract?
The California interest was said to be sufficiently strong and
pervasive to justify the court applying California law to the
determination of the three sub-issues involved in the preliminary question. 1s The results were that the employment agency
was found to be the agent of the employer, an oral contract
was held to have been made in California, and the written
agreement was regarded as merely amplifying and memorializing the oral contract.
There is one curious aspect in this case. The primary concern is to determine when a labor contract may be regarded
as having been made in California. The court did not address
itself to the policy considerations involved in applying California law to determine where the contract is made, or to
California's interest in holding that labor contracts involving
state if the injured employee is a California resident at the time of the injury
and the contract of employment is entered into in California. Section 3600.5
provides that if an employee is hired in
California but injured outside California he shaH receive compensation
according to the laws of California.
The only issue here turns on whether,

within the meaning of sections 5305 and
3600.5 of the Labor Code, applicant,
at the time of his injuries in Utah, was
working pursuant to an employment
contract made in California." 68 Cal.
2d at II, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 442, 434 P.2d
at 994.
18. 68 Ca1.2d at 13-14. 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 444, 434 P.2d at 996.
CAL LAW 1969
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California residents are made in California, but rather to the
policy considerations of applying California law to determine
the legal consequences of separate incidents in the process of
making a contract. If, under California law, the writing were
regarded as a supercession of the prior oral agreement, while
under Wyoming law it was merely a formalizing of that agreement, would California, in view of its interest in the application
of its own workme'n's compensation law, have concluded
that, as a matter of California policy, the contract was made in
California if any substantial event in the negotiations between
the parties occurred in California or while the California resident-employee was still in California? Again we have an
illustration of how much may depend upon the manner in
which the question is put. Do we ask what is California's
interest in having this agreement a California contract? Or
do we ask what is California's interest in applying its law to
determine the agency status of an employment agency?
The third case, Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc./ 9 also
involved an industrial accident. In this case, the injured
party was a Nevada resident, working on a Nevada project,
under a contract made in Nevada-every contact was in
Nevada except that the general contractor was a California
c'orporation. Under Nevada law, the plaintiff, although an
independent contractor, was subject to the Nevada Industrial
Insurance Act as the exclusive remedy for his injuries. Under
California law, if applicable, he could maintain a commonlaw tort action against the defendant. California quite properly held that it had no interest in the matter and refused relief.
Some recapitulation and synthesis are appropriate, but before attempting it, two other decisions need to be considered.
The Choice of Law Process-Contract Rights and Remedies
Younker v. Reseda Manor 20 involved the applicability, in
a suit in California, of section 580b of the Code of Civil Pro19. 262 Cal. App.2d 741, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 56 (1968).
90
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cedure to a Nevada land transaction. This section reads:
"No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any
sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to complete
his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage,
given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the
purchase price of real property." The plaintiffs were Nevada
residents; the defendants were purchasers of Nevada land
who had given a promissory note, secured by deed of trust
on the land, for part of the purchase price. The transaction
was consummated in Nevada and the note was executed and
payable there. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for a
summary judgment; the court of appeals reversed. That
court concluded that section 580b could be applied to the
transaction, since it purported to relate to actions after default and was not limited to the proceedings of foreclosure or
judicial or private sale of the land. The court also concluded
that section 580b should apply, for two reasons. The first
reason was that defendants were California residents, and in
"land sales, where the land is given as security for the debt
to the vendor, this state has an interest in protecting purchasers from judgments for deficiency."l In other words,
California's concern about the solvency of its residents may
justify protecting them against suit in California courts on
obligations incurred outside California in transactions where
California does not believe such an obligation should arise.
This is, it is suggested, a rather provincial and unduly narrow
view of California's interest.
The second reason is even harder to justify. The affidavit
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment averred
that the parties were concerned about the possibility of a
deficiency judgment and that the sellers had represented that
the law of Nevada was the same as that of California in respect to deficiency judgments. This would seem, on its face,
to indicate that the parties contracted with clear recognition
that the law of Nevada would govern, but with some doubt
as to what that law was. If anything, under principles of party
1. 255 Cal. App.2d at 437, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 202.
CAL LAW 1969
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autonomy or the reasonable expectation of the parties, the application of Nevada law would seem to be in order. 2 The
court's treatment of seller's representation is curious. The
opinion states:
We do not regard the admissibility of this oral statement
as related to estoppel in general (which was not pleaded)
or to fraud, or to attempts to vary the terms of a written
instrument. On the subject of choice of laws, however,
where respondents contend that the law of the state where
they seek to recover should not apply because superior
contacts of the state of situs exist, we deem it relevant
to consider the statement alleged (and accepted by us,
at this stage) to have been made by the prospective
creditor. 3
Why this is, or should be, relevant, was not discussed.
A similar problem had been presented in an earlier decision,
Kish v. Bay Counties Guaranty Co. 4 Kish also involved, in
part, a Nevada land transaction. The facts are complex and a
recitation thereof is unnecessary to the matter under discussion. Suffice to say that, in considering the availability of
section 580b as a defense, the court there stated:
Section 580b, on the other hand, destroys rights that
would otherwise exist, by directing that any satisfaction
of the debt must come from the land. The protection
the statute provides is a part of the contract between
borrower and secured lender. (Emphasis added.) The
fact that the land lies in another state makes no difference,
when the contract was made in California and was to be
performed here. 5
These decisions have created an unfortunate confusion.
Under Y ounkers, section 580b applies to actions in California
courts against California residents, regardless of where the
2. Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d
588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906
(1961).
3. 255 Cal. App.2d at 437, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 202.
92
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contract is made; it is not clear whether that court would apply
it to actions in California courts against nonresidents. Under
Kish, section 580b applies to contracts "made in California
and.
. to be performed here"; it is not clear whether
that court would apply it to contracts made in California and
to be performed elsewhere.
The decisions are hopelessly inconsistent in theory and
approach, and each leaves much unsettled. It is regrettable
that the supreme court has not clarified this matter; it is to
be hoped that it will do so at the next opportunity.
Recapitulation of the Choice of Law Process
California is now clearly committed to the interest analysis
approach. This means that the advocate may no longer
merely direct the court's attention to the geographical locale
of the event and thereby solve his choice of law problems.
Rather, the advocate now must first focus attention on the
precise issue in controversy, then develop the interests of
the states affected or served by the rule invoked, and finally
convince the court that the interest which benefits his client
should prevail. If the legislature has determined the California policy and asserted the local interest in its application
(as in the Travelers Insurance case) part of the advocate's
work is done. But his ingenuity in putting forth the precise
issue in its most favorable light (as witness again the Travelers case) may well be determinative.
In taking an over-view of the cases, slight indications of
a pattern emerge. There was a notable tendency to apply California policy to favor or protect the interest of a party who
was a California resident at all relevant times. Thus in
Travelers, the California Workmen's Compensation Act was
applied to compensate for an industrial accident in Utah; in
Younker, California policy was invoked to protect a California
resident against a deficiency judgment on a purchase money
mortgage on out-of-state land. Reich's California domicile
at the time of suit may have been irrelevant in view of the
congruence between Ohio and California law, but it seems
clear from the opinion that if plaintiff had been a California
CAL LAW 1969

93

Con8ict of Laws

resident at the time of the event, California policy would have
prevailed. Only in Schneider was California policy not invoked to aid a California resident; but here California policy
was neither clear nor significant, and defendant's California
residence did not exist at the time of the event.
But the fundamental issue is still one of determining the
state's interest or policy and this is best illustrated by the
Younker and Kish decisions. Without critical analysis,
Younker may seem to be returning to the view that the remedy
is a matter of procedure and procedure is a matter for the
forum. In one sense this is true; namely that if the forum
state does not provide a court, or a remedy, no action is
maintainable. And we will continue to have instances where
California, by closing its doors to certain types of cases, will
prevent recovery. But the real problem in cases such as
Younker and Kish is to determine the legislative intent, and
hence California policy or interest. Did the legislature, by
a statute such as section 580b, intend to bar such suits, or
to regulate contracts made in California, or to regulate contracts involving California land, or all three or some combination thereof? That is the question that must be answered
before California's interest can be determined and the choice
of law made.
There is another aspect to cases such as Younker and
Schneider. Nevada, with a proper jurisdictional statute, could
have subjected the defendants in Younker to suit in its courts.
Colorado clearly had the power, in Schneider, to subject the
defendant to the jurisdiction of its courts in a suit for a tort
committed in Colorado, particularly when the defendant was
a Colorado domiciliary at the time of the tort.
In both cases a proper "long-arm statute" would have enabled plaintiff to obtain a judgment in the other state, sue
in California on the judgment and thus avoid any clash with
California law and policy. This is particularly important in
reverse, since California's jurisdictional statutes, so far as individual defendants are concerned, are primitive and frequently
force California plaintiffs to seek relief in another state on
a California transaction, with the possible application of the
94
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other state's policy to defeat the claim. 6 As the interest analysis approach spreads to other jurisdictions, it becomes increasingly important that California courts possess the means
to acquire jurisdiction over the necessary parties, so that this
state's policy may be applied to California-based transactions.
Support Decrees

May a California court modify a lump-sum alimony and
child-support agreement that has been completely incorporated into a Georgia divorce decree that is unalterable in
Georgia, when the judgment debtor has become a California
resident? In Elkind v. Byck,7 the California Supreme Court,
relying on Georgia's adoption of the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act and California Civil Code section
139 answered this question in the affirmative.
The defendant-obligor contended that the California court
was compelled to give full faith and credit to the Georgia
decree on the authority of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Yarborough v. Yarborough. 8 That case dealt with
South Carolina's power to modify an alimony and childsupport agreement, that was not modifiable under Georgia
law. The Supreme Court held that South Carolina had
to give full faith and credit to the Georgia decree. In Elkind,
the California court held that Yarborough was not controlling
for two reasons. First, in Yarborough the defendant-obligor
had maintained his domicile in Georgia, and had satisfied his
duty under its law, while in Elkind the obligor had removed
to California and was domiciled here. This, it was said, was
sufficient to make California law applicable. Second, prior
to the original decree in Elkind, the Georgia legislature had
adopted a statute imposing a duty on the part of parents to
support dependent children and providing that such duty
6. See for example, Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543
(1964) where California residents,
forced to sue in Oregon on a California
contract, were defeated by application
of Oregon policies.

7. 68 Cal.2d
439 P.2d 316
8. 290 U.S.
S.C!. 181, 90

453, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404,
(1968).
202, 78 L.Ed. 269, 54
A.L.R. 924 (1933).
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was to be determined by "the laws of the State where the
obligor was present during the period for which the support
is sought".9 There was no similar legislation in effect at the
time of the Yarborough decree.
This legislation, the court said, although continuing to make
the decree nonmodifiable in Georgia, would allow another
state in which the obligor then resided to determine whether
it should modify the decree. "The decree therefore does not
purport to govern defendant's obligations when he does not
reside in Georgia."lo This analysis, in effect, enabled California to give full faith and credit to the Georgia decree,
as so limited and construed, and still carry out the policy
of Civil Code section 139, which provides that child support
agreements are "separate and severable" from other provisions
of a divorce decree. Thus the trial court had power to modify
the decree on a proper showing of changed circumstances.
Dissatisfaction with the Yarborough decision has been frequently expressed by the courts and commentators. Obviously, the California Supreme Court is not in a position to
overrule the United States Supreme Court. However, the
California opinion, while purporting only to distinguish Yarborough, carries overtones of basically disagreeing with the
majority decision and favoring the dissent by Mr. Justice
Stone. Perhaps the California Supreme Court, by adding its
great prestige, may help to bring about the realization of
Professor Ehrenzweig's cogent challenge:
Support claims of minors have usually been subjected
to general rules of support recognition which have been
developed by and for adversary proceedings between
spouses. This is not always justified. The minor's welfare is a matter of public concern, and neither the forum
state nor the minor himself were usually represented
in the proceedings underlying the decree which is sought
to be enforced . . . Courts are becoming increasingly
aware of their role as parens patriae. It may be hoped
9. Ga. Laws 1956, URESA § 6, see
Ga. Code Ann. § 99-907(a), cited at 68
Cal.2d at 456, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
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10. 68 Ca1.2d at 459, 67 Cal. Rptr.
at 408.
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that they will in such cases
gradually discard
the formalism which continues to beset the conflicts law
of domestic relations. And it may be hoped that the
only decision of the Supreme Court in this field [Yarborough] wiIl not stand in the way of such a development. l l
11. A. Ehrenzweig, COl/flicts of Law
(1962) § 85 at 279.

7
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